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Abstract
We consider a frictional labor market in which ﬁrms want to insure their senior
employees against income ﬂuctuations and, at the same time, want to recruit new
employees to ﬁll their vacant positions. Firms can commit to a wage schedule, i.e.
a schedule that speciﬁes the wage paid by the ﬁrm to its employees as function of
their tenure and other observables. However, ﬁrms cannot commit to the employment
relationship with any of their workers, i.e. ﬁrms can dismiss workers at will. We ﬁnd
that, because of the ﬁrm’s limited commitment, the optimal schedule prescribes not
only a rigid wage for senior employees, but also a downward rigid wage for new hires.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that, while the rigidity of the wage of senior workers does not aﬀect
the allocation of labor, the rigidity of the wage of new hires magniﬁes the response of
unemployment and vacancies to negative shocks to the aggregate productivity of labor.
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Imagine a ﬁrm that needs to ﬁll a vacant position in its accounting department. Since the
economy is in a severe recession, the ﬁrm can attract some candidates by oﬀe r i n gal o w
hiring wage. However, since workers dislike income ﬂuctuations, the ﬁrm continues to oﬀer
to its senior accountants the same high wage that they received before the economy entered
the recession. Now, imagine that two candidates show up at the ﬁrm’s door. Then, the
ﬁrm has the incentive to ﬁll the vacancy with the ﬁrst candidate, and to replace one of the
senior accountants with the second candidate. And if the ﬁrm is unable to commit to the
employment relationship with its workers, it will replace one of the senior accountants.
In this paper, we want to build a model of the worker replacement problem described in
the previous paragraph. Then, we want to use the model to understand how the replacement
problem aﬀects the design of the optimal wage schedule of the ﬁrm. That is, the schedule
that speciﬁe st h ew a g ep a i db yt h eﬁrm to its employees conditional on their tenure and
other observable characteristics of the ﬁrm and of the aggregate economy. Finally, we want
to use the model to understand how the replacement problem (through its eﬀect on the wage
schedule) aﬀects the response of unemployment, vacancies and other labor market variables
to aggregate productivity shocks.
1.2 Summary
We consider an economy populated by risk-neutral ﬁrms and by risk-averse workers who do
not have access to the credit and the insurance markets. At the beginning of each period,
new ﬁrms enter the labor market and post a wage schedule, i.e. a schedule that speciﬁes the
wage paid by the ﬁrm to its employees, conditional on their tenure, the ﬁrm’s productivity,
and the aggregate conditions of the economy. After having observed the schedule posted by
new and old ﬁrms, unemployed workers choose where to apply for a job. We assume that
ﬁrms can commit to their wage schedule. However, we assume that ﬁrms cannot commit
to the employment relationship with any of their workers, i.e. ﬁrms can dismiss workers at
will. Moreover, in order to keep the model tractable, we assume that ﬁrms are productive
for two periods only.
2In this environment, the ﬁrm has two goals. First, the ﬁrm wants to insure its workers
against income ﬂuctuations. In order to do this eﬃciently, the ﬁrm should oﬀer to its senior
workers a wage that is independent from its productivity and from the aggregate conditions of
the economy. Also, the ﬁrm should employ its senior workers as long as the gains from trade
are positive. Second, the ﬁrm wants to recruit new workers to ﬁll its vacant positions. In
o r d e rt od ot h i se ﬃciently, the ﬁrm should oﬀer to its junior workers a wage that positively
depends on its productivity and on the aggregate conditions of the economy. However,
because the ﬁrm has limited commitment, it cannot insure its senior employees eﬃciently
and, at the same time, recruit new employees eﬃciently. For example, consider a situation
in which the ﬁrm’s productivity falls so much that the eﬃcient hiring wage is lower than
the eﬃcient insurance wage. In this situation, if the schedule were to prescribe the eﬃcient
insurance wage for senior employees and the eﬃcient hiring wage for junior employees, the
ﬁrm would replace all the senior workers for whom there is a qualiﬁed substitute among the
pool of new applicants.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we study how the optimal schedule resolves the tension
between eﬃcient insurance provision and eﬃcient recruitment caused by the ﬁrm’s limited
commitment. We ﬁnd that, in the second period of the ﬁrm’s life, the optimal schedule
divides the ﬁrm’s productivity space into three regions. If the ﬁrm’s productivity falls in the
highest region, the optimal schedule prescribes the eﬃcient hiring wage for junior employees
and the eﬃcient insurance wage for senior employees. In this region, the ﬁrm does not
replace its senior employees with new hires, because the eﬃcient hiring wage is greater than
the eﬃcient insurance wage. If the ﬁrm’s productivity falls in the intermediate region, the
optimal schedule prescribes the same wage for junior and senior employees. This wage is
greater than the eﬃcient hiring wage and smaller than the eﬃcient insurance wage, but
it guarantees that senior workers will not be replaced with new hires. When the ﬁrm’s
productivity falls in the lowest region, the design of the optimal schedule varies depending
on the parameters of the model. For example, if the search frictions in the labor market are
suﬃciently strong, the schedule prescribes that senior employees should be paid the eﬃcient
insurance wage, and that junior employees should be paid somewhat less than the eﬃcient
hiring wage. Given these prescriptions, the ﬁrm replaces its senior employees with a small,
3but positive probability.
In the second part of the paper, we study the eﬀect of the ﬁrm’s limited commitment
on the response of unemployment and vacancies to aggregate productivity shocks. We ﬁnd
that limited commitment magniﬁes the response of unemployment and vacancies to small
negative productivity shocks. In contrast, we ﬁnd that limited commitment does not aﬀect
the response of unemployment and vacancies to positive productivity shocks.
When a negative productivity shock hits the economy, the wage oﬀered by old ﬁrms
to junior employees does not fall as much as it would have fallen under full commitment,
and the wage oﬀered to senior employees falls more than under full commitment. While
the distortion on the wage of senior employees does not aﬀect the allocation of labor, the
d i s t o r t i o no nt h ew a g eo fj u n i o re m p l o y e e si m p l i e st h a tt o om a n yw o r k e r sa p p l yf o raj o b
at one of the old ﬁrms. For this reason, not enough new ﬁr m se n t e rt h el a b o rm a r k e t ,n o t
enough new vacancies open, and too many workers remain unemployed. In contrast, when
a positive productivity shock hits the economy, the wages oﬀered by old ﬁrms to junior and
senior employees are the same as under full commitment. For this reason, the number of
ﬁrms that enter the labor market, the number of vacancies that open, and the number of
workers who remain unemployed are the same as under full commitment.
Our ﬁndings are based on the assumption that a ﬁrm can commit to its wage schedule,
but cannot commit to the employment relationship with any of its workers. This assumption
is common in the literature (e.g. Thomas and Worrall 1988, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989,
Rudanko 2006) and can be justiﬁed in several ways. For example, a third party (e.g. a
court of law, a workers’ union) may not be able to verify whether a worker that leaves the
ﬁrm does so voluntarily, because of poor performance, because his job ceased to exist, or
because the ﬁrm replaced him with another worker. In contrast, a third party may be able
verify whether a worker has been employed by the ﬁrm and how much he has been paid.
For this reason, enforcing the ﬁrm’s promises about employment may be extremely diﬃcult,
while enforcing the ﬁrm’s promises about wages may be much easier. For the same reason,
enforcing severance payments may be diﬃcult as well.
There is also some empirical evidence that supports our assumption. For example, Bewley
(1999) ﬁnds that many ﬁrms set up an explicit pay structure, i.e. a system tying pay to
4individual output, qualiﬁcation, and seniority. However, Bewley does not report of any ﬁrms
that explicitly promise to their employees that they will not be replaced with new hires.
These observations suggest that ﬁrms are able to commit to their wage schedule but are
unable to commit to their employment relationships.
1.3 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the literature that studies the properties of the optimal employment
contract between a risk-neutral ﬁrm and a risk-averse worker who cannot access the insurance
and the credit markets. Azariadis (1975) and Bailey (1974) study the properties of the
optimal contract when both the ﬁr ma n dt h ew o r k e ra r ea b l et oc o m m i tt ot h e i re m p l o y m e n t
relationship. They ﬁnd that the optimal contract prescribes a wage that remains constant
over time and across states of the world. Holmstrom (1983) and Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991) study the properties of the optimal contract when only the ﬁrm can commit to the
employment relationship. They ﬁnd that the optimal contract prescribes a downward rigid
contract. Finally, Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Rudanko (2006) study the properties
of the optimal contract when neither the ﬁrm nor the worker is able to commit to the
employment relationship. They ﬁnd that the optimal contract prescribes a wage that remains
constant as long as it induces the two parties to stay together. In contrast to ours, these
papers abstract from the replacement problem because they either assume that the ﬁrm
can employ at most one worker at a time (as in Thomas and Worrall 1988 and in Rudanko
2006) or that the ﬁrm can commit to the employment relationship with its employees (as in
Holmstrom, 1983). Therefore, in contrast to ours, these papers do not predict any rigidity
in the hiring wage of successive cohorts of workers (which is the kind of wage rigidity that
magniﬁes unemployment ﬂuctuations).1
1Independently from us, Snell and Thomas (2007) develop a related theory of wage rigidity. They consider
an economy populated by risk-neutral ﬁrms and risk-averse workers who cannot access the insurance and
credit markets. Under the assumption that ﬁrms cannot wage discriminate between workers with diﬀerent
tenure, they ﬁnd that the optimal contract prescribes a wage that does not respond to productivity shocks as
much as a spot market wage. Moreover, under the assumption that new ﬁrms cannot enter the labor market,
they ﬁnd that there is involuntary unemployment, and that involuntary unemployment is countercyclical.
There are two key diﬀerences between this paper and ours. First, in our paper, the link between the wage
of senior and junior employees is not exogenous, but emerges endogenously as the optimal solution of the
replacement problem. Second, in our paper, new ﬁrms are allowed to enter the labor market. Moreover, the
rigidity of the hiring wage of old ﬁrms magniﬁes the response of unemployment to productivity shocks only
because it has an eﬀect of the entry of new ﬁrms.
5Our paper also relates to the literature that uses search models of the labor market
to measure the contribution of diﬀerent types of shocks to the cyclical volatility of unem-
ployment, vacancies and workers’ transition rates. Using Pissarides’ (1985) model, Shimer
(2005) ﬁnds that aggregate productivity shocks account for a negligible fraction of the cycli-
cal volatility of US unemployment and vacancies.2 Using a version of Pissarides’ model in
which the wage of new hires is assumed to be rigid, Hall (2005) ﬁnds that aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks account for almost all of the cyclical volatility of US unemployment and
vacancies. Similarly, using a search model in which ﬁrms are not allowed to adjust the wage
of new hires in every period, Gertler and Trigari (2006) ﬁnd that aggregate productivity
shocks cause large movements in the unemployment rate. In our paper, we ﬁnd that the
optimal solution to the worker-replacement problem is such that the wage of new hires is
downward rigid. In this sense, our paper provides a partial theoretical foundation to the
assumptions adopted by Hall (2005) and by Gertler and Trigari (2006).3
2 The Model
Time is discrete and continues forever. The economy is populated by a continuum of workers
with measure 1. Each worker is endowed with an indivisible unit of labor. Each worker max-
imizes the von Neumann-Morgenstern function
P∞
t=0 β
tu(ct),w h e r ect ∈ R+ is the worker’s
consumption in period t, u : R+ → R is a twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave function, and β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. The economy is also populated
by a continuum of ﬁrms with positive measure. Each ﬁrm can enter the labor market by
paying the investment cost I>0. When it is in the labor market, the ﬁrm operates a
2Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) argue that the ﬁndings in Shimer (2005) are very sensitive to the
strategy used to calibrate the Pissarides’ model. Menzio and Shi (2008a) and Ramey (2008) argue that
the Pissarides’ model provides a biased measure of the contribution of aggregate productivity shocks to
the cyclical volatility of the US labor market, because it fails to endogenize the workers’ transition from
employment to unemployment and across employers.
3Menzio (2005), Kennan (2008) and Moen and Rosen (2008) develop alternative theories of wage rigidity.
According to Menzio (2005), a ﬁrm does increase its hiring wage in response to a positive productivity
shock, because it does not want to reveal to its senior employees that the gains from trade have increased.
According to Kennan (2008), wages are determined as the outcome of an asymmetric information bargaining
game between the ﬁrm and the worker. If an expansion is associated with an increase in the extent of the
ﬁrm’s private information, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts will be more procyclical, and the worker’s wage will be less
procyclical than under symmetric information. Moen and Rosen (2008) consider a labor market with search
frictions, adverse selection and moral hazard. They ﬁnd that the worker’s share of the surplus from an
employment relationship is countercyclical.
6technology that turns labor into output according to the production function min{n,nt}yt,
where n>0 is the measure of jobs at the ﬁrm, nt ≥ 0 is the measure of workers employed
by the ﬁrm in period t,a n dyt ≥ 0 is the ﬁrm’s productivity in period t. After operating




tπt,w h e r eπt ∈ R is the ﬁrm’s proﬁti np e r i o dt.
Each period is divided into four stages: separation, entry, search, and production. During
the separation stage, an employed worker exogenously moves into unemployment with prob-
ability δ ∈ (0,1). Moreover, during the separation stage, an employed worker can voluntarily
move into unemployment, and a ﬁrm can voluntarily dismiss any of its employees.
During the second stage, a ﬁrm chooses whether to enter the labor market or not. If the
ﬁrm enters the labor market, it ﬁrst draws its idiosyncratic productivity y1 ∈ Y from the
probability distribution Ψ1(y1|x),w h e r ex ∈ X is the aggregate productivity of the economy,
X = {x1,x 2,...xN(x)} and Y = {y1,y 2,...yN(y)}. Then, the ﬁrm announces its wage schedule
ω1 = {w1,w i,2}.T h eﬁrst element of the schedule speciﬁe st h ew a g ep a i db yt h eﬁrm to a
worker who is employed in the current period, w1 ∈ R+. The second element of the schedule
is a function wi,2 : X ×Y ×[0,1] → R+ that speciﬁes the wage paid by the ﬁr mt oaw o r k e r
w h oi se m p l o y e di nt h en e x tp e r i o d ,g i v e nt h a tt h ew o r k e rh a st e n u r ei ∈ {1,2}, the aggregate
productivity of the economy4 is ˆ x ∈ X,t h eﬁrm’s idiosyncratic productivity is ˆ y2 ∈ Y ,a n d
the outcome of a lottery is ˆ σ2 ∈ [0,1]. It is useful to denote with ˆ s2 the vector {ˆ x, ˆ y2, ˆ σ2},
and with S the set X × Y × [0,1].
During the third stage, a worker gets the opportunity of searching for a job with a
probability that depends on his recent employment history. In particular, if the worker
was unemployed at the beginning of the period, he has the opportunity to search with
probability 1, otherwise he cannot search. If the worker has the opportunity to search, he
sends an application for a particular job to a particular ﬁrm.5 The worker’s application is
successful with probability λ(q),w h e r eq is the expected number of applications submitted
for the job, and λ : R+ → [0,1] is a twice diﬀerentiable function such that λ
0(q) < 0, λ(0) = 1
4Throughout this paper, the caret indicates variables in the next period.
5Alternatively, we could have assumed that workers apply to a ﬁrm, and not to a job. Under this
alternative speciﬁcation of the search process, our main qualitative results would still apply. However, the
ﬁrm’s value function, the optimality conditions for the wage schedule, and other key equations would become
more cumbersome.
7and λ(∞)=0 .C o n v e r s e l y ,t h eﬁrm ﬁnds a successful applicant for the job with probability
η(q)=λ(q)q., where η : R+ → [0,1] is a twice diﬀerentiable function such that η0(q) > 0,
η00(q) < 0, η(0) = 0 and η(∞)=1 .I f t h e ﬁrm ﬁnds a successful applicant, it has the
opportunity to hire him and to dismiss any other worker who might have been holding the
job. We ﬁnd it convenient to assume that the elasticity  η(q) of the job-ﬁlling probability
η(q) with respect to q is such that η(q) η(q)/(1- η(q)) is a strictly decreasing function.6
During the last stage, an unemployed worker produces and consumes b>0 units of
output. A worker employed at a new ﬁrm7 produces y1 units of output and consumes w1 of
them. A worker employed at an old ﬁrm produces y2 units of output, consumes w2 of them,
and then moves into unemployment. As implied by the notation, we assume that workers
can neither borrow nor save.8
At the end of the production stage, nature draws next period’s aggregate productivity
ˆ x from the probability distribution Ω(ˆ x|x). Then, for each new ﬁrm, nature draws next
period’s idiosyncratic productivity ˆ y2 from the probability distribution Ψ2(ˆ y2|ˆ x).A n dﬁnally,
for each new ﬁrm, nature draws the realization ˆ σ2 of next period’s lottery from the uniform
distribution over the interval [0,1].
3 Conditions and Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
At the beginning of each period, the state of the economy can be summarized by the current
realization of aggregate productivity and by the distribution of old ﬁr m sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent
wage schedules and employment levels. In this paper, we are interested in equilibria in
which the agents’ values and strategies depend on the state of the economy only through the
realization of aggregate productivity, and not through the entire distribution of old ﬁrms.9
6Our assumptions on λ(q) and η(q) are satisﬁed by many of the standard matching processes. For
example, our assumptions are satisﬁed by the urn-ball matching process, λ(q)=q−1(1 − exp(−q)) and
η(q)=1− exp(−q), and by the telephone-line matching process, λ(q)=( 1+q)−1 and η(q)=( 1+q)−1q.
7Througout the paper, we refer to the ﬁrms that have entered the labor market in the current period as
new ﬁrms; and we refer to the ﬁrms that entered the labor market in the previous period as old ﬁrms.
8This assumption is common in the literature on labor contracts, e.g. Azariadis (1975), Holmstrom
(1983), Thomas and Worrall (1988), Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), Boldrin and Horvath (1995), Burdett
and Coles (2003), Rudanko (2006).
9As we shall see in the next pages, the equilibrium conditions of our model deﬁne a system of functional
equations in which all of the equations depends on the state of the economy only through the aggregate state,
and not through the distribution of ﬁrms across employment states. Therefore, if this system of functional
equations admits a solution, there will be an equilibrium in which the agents’ values and strategies are
8In these equilibria, we can denote with U(x) the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker
whenever aggregate productivity is x. Similarly, whenever aggregate productivity is x,w e
can denote with W1(ω1;x) the lifetime utility of a worker employed by a new ﬁrm that oﬀers
the schedule ω1,a n dw i t hW2(w2;x) the lifetime utility of a worker employed by an old ﬁrm
that oﬀers him the wage w2. These value functions are measured at the beginning of the
production stage. Finally, we can denote with q(W;x) the expected queue of applicants
attracted by a job of type W,w h e r eW is the applicant’s lifetime utility if he successfully
matches with the job.10
3.1 Equilibrium Conditions
3.1.1 Worker’s Problem
Consider a worker who has the opportunity to apply for a job at the beginning of the search
stage. If the worker does not apply to any job, he enters the production stage unemployed.
If the worker applies to a job W, he succeeds in matching with the job with probability
λ(q(W;x)), and he fails with probability 1−λ(q(W;x)). If he succeeds, his lifetime utility is
W. If he fails, he enters the production stage unemployed. Therefore, the worker’s lifetime
utility at the beginning of the search stage is
Z(x)=U(x)+m a x W≥U(x){λ(q(W;x))(W − U(x))}. (E1)
Consider an unemployed worker at the beginning of the production stage. In the current
period, the worker produces and consumes b units of output. In the next period, the worker
enters the search stage unemployed and has the opportunity to apply for a job. Therefore,
the worker’s lifetime utility U(x) is equal to
U(x)=u(b)+βEˆ x|x[Z(ˆ x)]. (E2)
independent from the distribution of old ﬁrms. In this paper, we do not prove that the system of functional
equations admits a solution. However, the arguments developed by Menzio and Shi (2008b) to prove the
existence of a solution to the system of equilibrium conditions generated by a model of competitive search
on the job could be easily extended to our environment.
10Notice that W is the applicants’ lifetime utility if he successfully matches with the job. It is not the
applicant’s lifetime utility if he is hired for the job. The two values are diﬀerent when (oﬀ the equilibrium
path) the applicant matches with a job that is currently held by a senior employee, and the hiring wage is
greater than the senior employee’s wage.
9Throughout the paper, Eχ|x denotes the expectation of the variable χ conditional on x.
Next, consider a worker who is employed by an old ﬁrm at the beginning of the production
stage. In the current period, the worker consumes w2 units of output. In the next period,
the worker enters the search stage unemployed and has the opportunity to apply for a job.
Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility W2(w2;x) is equal to
W2(w2;x)=u(w2)+βEˆ x|x[Z(ˆ x)]. (E3)
We denote with μ(w;x) the probability that an old ﬁrm ﬁnds a successful applicant for a
job that oﬀers the value W2(w;x), i.e. μ(w;x)=η(q(W2(w;x);x)).
Finally, consider a worker who is employed by a new ﬁrm at the beginning of the pro-
duction stage. In the current period, the worker consumes w1 units of output. In the next
separation stage, the worker becomes unemployed with probability d and remains employed
with probability 1 − d,w h e r ed = δ if w2,2 is greater than b and smaller than ˆ y2,a n dd =1
otherwise. If the worker enters the next search stage unemployed, he does not have the
opportunity to apply for a job. If the worker is still employed at the beginning of the next
search stage, he is replaced by a new hire with probability ρμ(w1,2;ˆ x),w h e r eρ =1if w2,2 is
smaller than w1,2,a n dρ =0otherwise. With probability 1−ρμ(w1,2;ˆ x), the worker remains
employed until the next production stage. Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility W1(ω1;x)
is equal to
W1(ω1;x)= u(w1)+βEˆ s2|x[dU(ˆ x)+( 1− d)ρμ(w1,2;ˆ x)U(ˆ x)]+
βEˆ s2|x[(1 − d)(1 − ρμ(w1,2;ˆ x))W2(w2,2, ˆ x)].
(E4)
For the sake of brevity, the previous expression omits the dependence of w1,2,w 2,2,dand ρ
on ˆ s2.
3.1.2 Firm’s Problem
Consider a new ﬁrm at the beginning of the production stage. The wage schedule oﬀered
by the ﬁrm is ω1 = {w1,w i,2}. The measure of workers employed by the ﬁrm is n1.I nt h e
current period, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are n1(y1−w1). In the next period, the ﬁrm loses a fraction
d of its employees during the separation stage. During the search stage, the ﬁrm receives
q(W2(w1,2;ˆ x); ˆ x) applications for each of its n−n1(1−d) vacant positions. Moreover, if w1,2
10is smaller than w2,2,t h eﬁrm receives q(W2(w1,2;ˆ x); ˆ x) applications for each of its n1(1 − d)
ﬁlled positions. During the production stage, the ﬁrm employs n1(1 − d)(1 − ρμ(w1,2;ˆ x))
senior workers and [n − n1(1 − d)(1 − ρ)]μ(w1,2;ˆ x) junior workers. The ﬁrm pays the wage
w2,2 to all of its senior workers and the wage w1,2 to all of its junior workers. Therefore, the
ﬁrm’s lifetime proﬁts F1(ω1,n 1;s1) are equal to
F1(ω1,n 1;s1)= n1(y1 − w1)+
βEˆ s2|x {[n1(1 − d)(1 − ρμ(w1,2;ˆ x))](ˆ y2 − w2,2)}+
βEˆ s2|x {[n − n1(1 − d)(1 − ρ)]μ(w1,2;ˆ x)(ˆ y2 − w1,2)}.
(E5)
For the sake of brevity, the previous expression omits the dependence of w1,2,w 2,2,dand ρ
on ˆ s2.
Next, consider a new ﬁrm at the entry stage. First, the ﬁrm realizes its state s1,w h e r e
s1 = {x,y1,σ 1}. Then, the ﬁrm chooses which wage schedule to oﬀer. If the ﬁrm chooses
to oﬀer the wage schedule ω1,i t sp r o ﬁts at the beginning of the production stage are
F1(ω1,n 1;s1),w h e r en1 is equal to nη(q(W1(ω1;x);x)). Therefore, conditional on s1,t h e




s.t. n1 = nη(q(W1(ω1;x);x)).
(E6)
3.1.3 Queue Length
During the search stage, a worker chooses where to send an application. The beneﬁto f
applying to a job W is λ(q(W;x))W +( 1− λ(q(W;x)))U(x). The opportunity cost of
applying to a job W is Z(x). When the beneﬁt is strictly smaller than the cost, the worker’s
optimal search strategy is to not send his application to the job W. When the beneﬁti se q u a l
to the cost, the worker is indiﬀerent between sending his application there or somewhere else.
If the value W is oﬀered by a positive number of jobs, the queue length q(W;x) is
consistent with the worker’s optimal search strategy if and only if
Z(x) ≥ λ(q(W;x))W +( 1− λ(q(W;x)))U(x), (E7)
and q(W;x) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. If there is no job oﬀering the value W,
11the queue length q(W;x) is consistent with the worker’s optimal search strategy if and only
if λ(q(W;x))W +( 1− λ(q(W;x)))U(x) is smaller or equal than Z(x). Following most of
the literature on competitive search (e.g. Moen 1997, Acemoglu and Shimer 1999, Menzio
2007, Garibaldi and Moen 2008), we restrict attention to equilibria in which the queue length
q(W;x) satisﬁes condition (E7) for all W0s.
3.1.4 Market Clearing and Free Entry
In equilibrium, the market for job applications clears, i.e. the measure of applications re-
ceived by new and old ﬁrms is equal to the measure of applications sent by unemployed
workers. When new ﬁrms do not receive any applications, this market clearing condition
determines the value of searching Z(x).W h e n n e w ﬁrms receive some applications, this
market clearing condition determines the number of new ﬁrms. In this case, the value of
searching Z(x) is determined by the ﬁrm’s free entry condition
Ey1|x[F(s1)] = I. (E8)
In this paper, we restrict attention to equilibria in which new ﬁrms receive a positive number
of applications.
3.2 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
T h ep r e v i o u sp a r a g r a p h sm o t i v a t et h ef o l l o w i n gd e ﬁnition of equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1: A Recursive Equilibrium with Entry (REE) consists of a search value function
Z : X → R, an unemployment value function U : X → R,aﬁrm’s proﬁt function F : S →
R, a policy function ω1 : S2 → R3
+, and a queue length function q : R × X → R+.T h e s e
functions satisfy the following conditions:
(i) For all x ∈ X, Z(x) satisﬁes equation (E1);
(ii) For all x ∈ X, U(x) satisﬁes equation (E2);
(iii) For all s ∈ S, F(s) is the maximum of (E6), and ω(s) is the associated maximizer;
(iv) For all W ∈ R and all x ∈ X, q(W;x) satisﬁes equation (E7);
(v) For all x ∈ X, F(s) satisﬁes equation (E8).
124 Micro Consequences of the Replacement Problem
Because of limited commitment, ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ between the goal of insuring their
senior employees against income ﬂuctuations, and the goal of recruiting new workers ef-
ﬁciently. To illustrate this point, consider a ﬁrm that enters the labor market, draws a
relatively high realization of the idiosyncratic component of productivity, and hires workers
at a relatively high wage. In the second period of activity, this ﬁrm is hit by a negative shock
to the idiosyncratic component of productivity. In order to insure the income of its senior
employees, this ﬁrm would like to oﬀe rt h e mt h es a m ew a g ea si nt h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d . I n
order to eﬃciently recruit junior employees, this ﬁrm would like to oﬀer them a relatively
low wage. However, given these wages, the ﬁrm would have the incentive to replace senior
employees with new hires. In this section, we characterize the optimal resolution to this
trade-oﬀ between insurance and recruitment.
4.1 Necessary Conditions for Optimality
Consider an old ﬁrm at the beginning of the period. Let s2 = {x2,y 2,σ2} denote, respectively,
the current realization of the aggregate component of productivity, the realization of the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc component of productivity, and the realization of the sunspot. Let n1 denote the
number of senior workers currently employed by the ﬁrm. Let ω1 ={w1,w i,2}d e n o t et h e
ﬁrm’s wage schedule. We ﬁnd it convenient to let ψ2 denote the tuple {n1,w 1,s 2};t ol e tv1
denote the wage that the schedule ω1 prescribes for junior workers in state s2;a n dt ol e tv2
denote the wage that the schedule ω1 prescribes for senior workers in state s2.
If v2 ≤ v1 and b ≤ v2 ≤ y2, the sum of senior workers’ lifetime utility and ﬁrm’s proﬁts
is equal to
Vk(v1,v 2;ψ2)= n1 [(1 − δ)u(v2)+Φ(x2)]/u0(w1)+
[n1(1 − δ)](y2 − v2)+[ n − n1(1 − δ)]μ(v1;x2)(y2 − v1),
(C1)
where Φ(x) is deﬁned as to δu(b)+βEˆ x|x[Z(ˆ x)].T h e ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f
(C1) is the product of the number of senior workers, n1, and the lifetime utility of each of
these workers, [(1 − δ)u(v2)+Φ(x2)]/u0(w1). The reader should notice that the ﬁrst term
is measured in units of output because the worker’s utility (1 − δ)u(v2)+Φ(x2) is divided
by the worker’s marginal utility of consumption, u0(w1). The second term on the right hand
13side of (C1) is the number of senior workers employed by the ﬁrm at the production stage,
n1(1 − δ),t i m e st h ep r o ﬁts created by each one of these workers, y2 − v2.T h e l a s t t e r m
on the right hand side of (C1) is the number of junior workers employed by the ﬁrm at the
production stage, [n − n1(1 − δ)] μ(v1;x2),t i m e st h ep r o ﬁts created by each one of these
workers, y2 − v1. Clearly, the second and third terms are also measured in units of output.
We denote with V ∗
k the maximum of Vk(v1,v 2) with respect to v1 and v2, subject to the
constraints v2 ≤ v1 and b ≤ v2 ≤ y2.
If v1 <v 2 and b ≤ v2 ≤ y2, the sum of senior workers’ lifetime utility and ﬁrm’s proﬁts
is equal to
Vr(v1,v 2;ψ2)= n1 {(1 − δ)[μ(v1;x2)u(b)+( 1− μ(v1;x2))u(v2)] + Φ(x2)}/u0(w1)+
[n1(1 − δ)](1 − μ(v1;x2))(y2 − v2)+nμ(v1;x2)(y2 − v1).
(C2)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (C2) is the product of the number of senior workers
and the lifetime utility of each of these workers. The second term on the right hand side of
(C2) measures the proﬁts created by senior workers; and the last term measures the proﬁts
created by junior workers. The reader should notice that the terms on the right hand side of
(C2) are diﬀerent from those on the right hand side of (C1) because, when v1 is smaller than
v2,t h eﬁrm has the incentive to replace senior workers with junior hires. We denote with
V ∗
r the maximum of Vr(v1,v 2) with respect to v1 and v2, subject to the constraints v1 <v 2
and b ≤ v2 ≤ y2.
Lemma 1 establishes that, if a wage schedule solves the ﬁrm’s problem (E6) in period
t − 1, then it also maximizes the sum of senior workers’ lifetime utility and ﬁrm’s proﬁts in
state s2 of period t. In other words, Lemma 1 establishes that an optimal schedule is ex-post
(constrained) eﬃcient.
Lemma 1: Let ω∗
1 = {w∗
1,w ∗
i,2} be a schedule that solves the ﬁrm’s problem (E6) for s1 =
{x1,y 1,σ1}.( i )I fw∗
2,2(s2) ≤ w∗
1,2(s2) and b ≤ w∗
2,2(s2) ≤ y2, then Vk(w∗
1,2(s2),w ∗
2,2(s2);ψ2)
is equal to max{V ∗
k (ψ2),V∗
r (ψ2)}.(ii) If w∗
1,2(s2) <w ∗
2,2(s2) and b ≤ w∗
2,2(s2) ≤ y2, then
Vr(w∗
1,2(ψ2),w ∗
2,2(ψ2);s2) is equal to max{V ∗
k (ψ2),V∗
r (ψ2)}. (iii) If and only if y2 ≥ b,
w∗
2,2(s2) belongs to the interval [b,y2].
Proof: In the Appendix. ¥
144.2 The Best Schedule With and Without Worker Replacement
Lemma 1 suggests a simple procedure for characterizing the prescriptions of the optimal
schedule in state s2 = {x2,y 2,σ2}, y2 ≥ b. First, we characterize the wages {v1,v 2} that
maximize the sum of the senior workers’ lifetime utility and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, subject to the
no-replacement constraint, v2 ≤ v1, and the individual rationality constraint, b ≤ v2 ≤ y2.
These wages can be interpreted as the prescriptions of the best schedule that does not induce
the ﬁrm to replace senior workers with junior hires. Second, we characterize the wages
{v1,v 2} that maximize the sum of the senior workers’ lifetime utility and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts,
subject to the replacement constraint, v1 <v 2, and the individual rationality constraint.
These wages can be interpreted as the prescriptions of the best schedule that induces the
ﬁrm to replace senior workers with junior hires. Finally, we identify the prescriptions of the
optimal schedule by comparing the values, V ∗
k and V ∗
r , associated to the best schedule with
and without worker replacement. In the following pages, we carry out this procedure for w1
and y2 greater than z(x2), where z(x2) is the consumption equivalent of the worker’s ﬂow
value of searching, i.e. u(z(x)) = Z(x) − βEˆ x|x[Z(ˆ x)].11.
4.2.1 A Useful Benchmark: Full Commitment
As a preliminary step, we ﬁnd it useful to consider the following hypothetical question: “If
the ﬁrm could commit to not replace senior workers with junior hires in state s2,w h a t
wages would the optimal schedule prescribe?” The answer to this hypothetical question is
the solution to the following maximization problem
V ∗
c (ψ2)=m a x
v1,v2
n1[(1 − δ)u(v2)+Φ(x2)]/u0(w1)+
n1(1 − δ)(y2 − v2)+[ n − n1(1 − δ)]μ(v1;x2)(y2 − v1),
s.t. b ≤ v2 ≤ y2.
(C3)
The solution to the maximization problem (C3) with respect to v1 is equal to the
wage that maximizes the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts from a vacant position, i.e. wh(s2)=
argmaxμ(v1;x)(y2 − v1). Given the properties of the job-ﬁlling probability function, it fol-
11When w1 <z (x2) ≤ y2, it is immediate to verify that the optimal schedule prescribes the ﬁrst-best
hiring wage wh(s2) f o rj u n i o rw o r k e r s ,a n dt h eﬁrst-best insurance wage wi(w1,s 2) f o rs e n i o rw o r k e r s( wh
and wi are deﬁned in the next subsection). When b ≤ y2 ≤ z(x2), the optimal schedule prescribes that
junior workers should be oﬀered a wage smaller than z(x2), and that senior workers should be oﬀered the
wage wi(w1,s 2).
15lows that the wage wh(s2) is strictly greater than the worker’s ﬂow value of searching, z(x2),
and strictly smaller than the ﬁrm’s productivity of labor, y2. Given the properties of the
job-ﬁlling probability function, it also follows that the wage wh(s2) is strictly increasing with
respect to the ﬁrm’s productivity y2. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to wh(s2) as
the ﬁrst-best hiring wage.
The solution to the maximization problem (C3) with respect to v1 is equal to the wage
that maximizes the sum of the lifetime utility of a senior worker and the proﬁts that this
worker generates for the ﬁrm, i.e. wi(w1,s 2)=a r gm a x [ u(v2)/u0(w1)+Φ(x2)+y2 − v2],s . t .
b ≤ v2 ≤ y2. Given the concavity of the utility function, it follows that wi(w1,s 2) is equal to
the ﬁrm’s productivity for all y2 smaller than w1; and it is equal to w1 for all y2 greater than
w1. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to wi(w1,s 2) as the ﬁrst-best insurance wage.
Given the properties of wh and wi, it follows that there exists a k1(w1,x 2) such that if
the ﬁrm’s productivity y2 is smaller than k1,t h eﬁrst-best hiring wage is strictly smaller
than the ﬁrst-best insurance wage. And if the ﬁrm’s productivity is greater than k1,t h e
ﬁrst-best hiring wage is strictly greater than the ﬁrst-best insurance wage. The properties
of the wages wh and wi are established in Lemma 2 and illustrated in Figure 1.
Lemma 2: Denote with wh(s2) and wi(w1,s 2) the wages that solve the maximization problem
(C3). (i) The wage wh(s2) is strictly increasing with respect to y2; it is strictly greater than
z(x2); and it is strictly smaller than y2. (ii) The wage wi(w1,s 2) is equal to min{w1,y 2}.
Proof: In the Appendix. ¥
4.2.2 The Best Schedule Without Worker Replacement
Next, we need to characterize the wages that maximize the sum of the senior workers’ lifetime
utility and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, subject to the no-replacement constraint and the individual
rationality constraint. Formally, we need to characterize the solution to the following maxi-
mization problem
V ∗
k (ψ2)=m a x
v1,v2
n1[(1 − δ)u(v2)+Φ(x2)]/u0(w1)+
n1(1 − δ)(y2 − v2)+[ n − n1(1 − δ)]μ(v1;x2)(y2 − v1),
s.t. v2 ≤ v1,b ≤ v2 ≤ y2.
(C4)
Notice that the maximization problem (C4) is a version of the commitment problem
16(C3) with the addition of the no-replacement constraint. Also, notice that the solution
to the commitment problem does satisfy the no-replacement constraint when the ﬁrm’s
productivity is greater than k1, and it violates it when the ﬁrm’s productivity is smaller
than k1.T h e r e f o r e ,i fy2 is greater than k1, the solution to the maximization problem (C4)
is equal to the ﬁrst-best hiring wage, wh(s2),a n dt h eﬁrst-best insurance wage, wi(w1,s 2).
Instead, if the ﬁrm’s productivity y2 is smaller than k1, we can prove that the solution to the
maximization problem (C4) is equal to a wage, wf(ψ2), that the ﬁrm oﬀers to both senior
and junior employees. Moreover, if the ﬁrm’s productivity y2 is greater than k2(n1,w 1,x 2)
and smaller than k1, wf(ψ2) is strictly greater than the ﬁrst-best hiring wage and strictly
smaller than the ﬁrst-best insurance wage. If the ﬁrm’s productivity y2 is smaller than k2,
wf(ψ2) is equal to y2. The properties of the solution to the maximization problem (C4) are
established in Lemma 3 and illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 2.
Lemma 3: Let vk
1(ψ2) and vk
2(ψ2) denote the wages that solve the maximization problem
(C4). (i) For all y2 in the interval between z(x2) and k2(n1,w 1,x 2), vk
1(ψ2) and vk
2(ψ2) are
equal to y2. (ii) For all y2 in the non-empty interval between k2(n1,w 1,x 2) and k1(w1,x 2),
vk
1(ψ2) and vk
2(ψ2) are equal to wf(ψ2),w h e r ewf(ψ2) >w h(s2) and wf(ψ2) <w i(w1,s 2).
(iii) For all y2 greater than k1(w1,x 2), vk
1(ψ2) is equal to wh(s2), and vk
2(ψ2) is equal to
wi(w1,s 2).
Proof: In the Appendix. ¥
4.2.3 The Best Schedule With Worker Replacement
Finally, we need to characterize the wages that maximize the sum of the senior workers’
lifetime utility and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, subject to the replacement constraint and the individ-
ual rationality constraint. Formally, we need to characterize the solution to the following
maximization problem
V ∗
r (ψ2)=m a x
v1,v2
n1{(1 − δ)[μ(v1;x2)u(b)+( 1− μ(v1;x2))u(v2)] + Φ(x2)}/u0(w1)+
n1(1 − δ)(1 − μ(v1;x2))(y2 − v2)+nμ(v1;x2)(y2 − v1),
s.t. v1 <v 2,b ≤ v2 ≤ y2.
(C5)
When v1 is smaller than v2, a marginal increase in the wage oﬀered to junior hires not only
aﬀects the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts from a vacant position, but it also lowers the employment
17probability of senior workers. Therefore, the solution to the maximization problem (C5) with
respect to v1 is smaller than the ﬁrst-best hiring wage. Also, when v1 is smaller than v2,a
marginal increase in v2 exclusively aﬀects the sum between the lifetime utility of a senior
worker and the proﬁts created by each of them. Therefore, the solution to the maximization
problem (C5) with respect to v2 is equal to the ﬁrst-best insurance wage. The properties of
the solution to the maximization problem (C5) are established in Lemma 4 and are illustrated
in panel (b) of Figure 2.
Lemma 4: Let vr
1(ψ2) and vr
2(ψ2) denote the wages that solve the maximization problem
(C5). (i) For all y2 in the interval between z(x2) and k1(w1,x 2), vr
1(ψ2) is greater than z(x)
and smaller than wh(s2). (ii) For all y2 in the interval between z(x2) and k1(w1,x 2), vr
2(ψ2)
is equal to wi(w1,s 2).
Proof: In the Appendix. ¥
4.3 The Optimal Schedule
Now, we are in the position to characterize the prescriptions of the optimal schedule ω∗
1
in state s2.I f t h e ﬁrm’s productivity y2 is greater than k1, the best schedule without





to {wh(s2),w i(w1,s 2)}. Given these wages, senior workers have the same probability of
employment and the same consumption as under full commitment. Given these wages, each
of the ﬁrm’s vacant positions attracts the same number of applicants and pays the same wage
as under full commitment. Therefore, the sum of the senior workers’ lifetime utility and the
ﬁrm’s proﬁts under the no-replacement schedule is the same as under full commitment. In
turn, this implies that the no-replacement schedule is optimal if the ﬁrm’s productivity y1 is
greater than k1.
If the ﬁrm’s productivity y2 is smaller than k1, the best schedule without worker replace-
ment prescribes the wages {vk
1(ψ2),vk
2(ψ2)}, where vk
i (ψ2)=wf(ψ2). Given these wages,
senior workers have the same probability of employment, but lower consumption than un-
der full commitment. Given these wages, each of the ﬁrm’s vacant positions attracts more
applicants and pays higher wages than under full commitment. In contrast, if the ﬁrm’s




1(ψ2) ≤ wh(s2) and vr
2(ψ2)=wi(w1,s 2). Given these wages,
senior workers have the same consumption as under full commitment, but a lower proba-
bility of employment. Given these wages, each of the ﬁrm’s vacant positions attracts fewer
applicants and pays lower wages than under full commitment. Therefore, when the ﬁrm’s
productivity y2 is smaller than k1, both the no-replacement schedule and the replacement
schedule introduce some distortions with respect to the full commitment benchmark and, in
general, either one of them may be optimal.
However, when the ﬁrm’s productivity y2 is suﬃciently close to k1, the ranking between
the two schedules is unambiguous. On the one hand, when y2 gets closer and closer to
k1, the wage prescribed by the no-replacement schedule becomes closer and closer to both
the full commitment insurance and hiring wages. Therefore, when y2 gets closer and closer
to k1, the sum of the senior workers’ lifetime utility and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts under the no-
replacement schedule gets closer and closer to the full commitment benchmark. On the
other hand, the sum of the senior workers’ lifetime utility and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts under the
replacement schedule remains bounded away from the full commitment benchmark even
when y2 converges to k1.I n f a c t , i f vr
1(ψ2) converges to a wage greater than z(x2),t h e
schedule generates too much employm e n tr i s kf o rs e n i o rw o r k e r s . I fvr
1(ψ2) converges to a
wage smaller than z(x2), the schedule does not attract enough unemployed workers to the
ﬁrm’s vacant positions.
If there are enough frictions in the matching process,12 we can construct examples in
which the replacement schedule is optimal when the ﬁrm’s productivity y2 is smaller than
some critical threshold k3. In these examples, when y2 is smaller than k3,t h en o - r e p l a c e m e n t
schedule prescribes that both senior and junior employees should be paid y2.I n c o n t r a s t ,
the replacement schedule prescribes that senior employees should be paid y2, and that junior
employees should be paid a wage between z(x2) and y2. In these examples, the additional
proﬁts made by the ﬁrm under the replacement schedule are worth more than the additional
employment security enjoyed by senior workers under the no-replacement schedule. Such an
example is illustrated in Figure 3.




12For example, in the job-ﬁlling probability function η(q)=Aq/(1+q), the extent of the matching frictions
increases as the parameter A falls.




2,2(s2)} is equal to {vk
1(ψ2),v k




1,s 2). (ii) There exists an  >0 such that, for all y2 between k1(w∗








Proof: In the Appendix. ¥
5 Macro Consequences of the Replacement Problem
In this section, we want to understand how ﬁrm’s limited commitment aﬀects the response
of unemployment and vacancies to aggregate productivity shocks. We ﬁnd that limited
commitment magniﬁe st h er e s p o n s eo fb o t hv a c a n c i e sa n du n e m p l o y m e n tt on e g a t i v es h o c k s
to aggregate productivity. However, we ﬁnd that limited commitment has no inﬂuence on
the way in which vacancies and unemployment respond to positive shocks.
5.1 Environment
In every period, the economy is either in the recessionary state xb, or in the expansionary
state xg. When the economy is in the recessionary state, the productivity of new ﬁrms is
y1,b, and the productivity of old ﬁrms is y2,b. When the economy is in the expansionary state,
the productivity of new ﬁrms is y1,g, y1,g >y 1,b, and the productivity of old ﬁrms is y2,g,
y2,g >y 2,b. In the next period, the economy is in the same state as in the current period with
probability p; and it is in a diﬀerent state with probability 1 − p, p → 1. This simplifying
assumption allows us to characterize the dynamics of the model in closed-form solution.13
We calibrate the productivity of new and old ﬁrms, y1 and y2, so that a worker employed
by a new ﬁrm under the optimal wage schedule ω1(x) is paid as much as a worker employed
by an old ﬁrm under the ﬁrst-best hiring wage wh(x),i . e . w1(xi)=wh(xi) for i = {b,g}.
Moreover, we calibrate the consumption equivalent of leisure, b, so that a worker employed by
an e wﬁr mu n d e rt h eo p t i m a lw a g es c h e d u l eh a st h es a m el i f e t i m eu t i l i t ya saw o r k e re m p l o y e d
by an old ﬁrm under the ﬁrst-best hiring wage, i.e. W1(ω1(xb);xb)=W2(wh(xb);xb). Thanks
13Given the assumptions about the stochastic process for y, it follows that the state of the ﬁrm is com-
pletely summarized by the aggregate state of the economy, x,a n db yt h eﬁrm’s age, t. Moreover, given the
assumptions about the stochastic process for x, it follows that the optimal wage schedule does not involve
randomization. Therefore, in the following pages, we will omit the dependence of various variables from the
ﬁrm’s productivity, yt, and from the realization of the sunspot, σ.
20to this calibration, the model has realistic implications that the ﬁrm’s hiring wage and the
workers’ lifetime utility are independent from the ﬁrm’s age (even though, for the sake of
tractability, we assume that the ﬁrm’s life is ﬁnite).
5.2 Wage Dynamics
When the economy is in the recessionary state xb,n e wﬁrms oﬀer the wage schedule ω(xb)=
{w1(xb),w i,2(ˆ x;xb)}. In the current period, the schedule prescribes the wage wh(xb), i.e.
w1(xb)=wh(xb). If in the next period the economy is still in state xb, the schedule pre-
scribes the ﬁrst-best hiring wage for junior workers and the ﬁrst-best insurance wage for senior
workers, i.e. w1,2(xb;xb)=wh(xb) and w2,2(xb;xb)=wi(w1(xb),x b).S i n c ewh(xb) is equal to
wi(w1(xb);xb), these prescriptions do not induce ﬁrms to replace senior workers with junior
hires. Similarly, if in the next period the economy moves to the state xg, the schedule pre-
scribes the ﬁrst-best hiring wage and the ﬁrst-best insurance wage, i.e. w1,2(xg;xb)=wh(xg)
and w2,2(xg;xb)=wi(w1(xb),x g).S i n c ewh(xg) is greater than wi(w1(xb),x g), these prescrip-
tions do not induce worker replacement. Overall, when the economy is in the recessionary
state, new ﬁrms oﬀe rt h es a m ew a g es c h e d u l et h a tt h e yw o u l do ﬀer if they had full commit-
ment.
When the economy is in the expansionary state xh,n e wﬁrms oﬀe rt h ew a g es c h e d u l e
ω(xg)={w1(xg),w i,2(ˆ x;xg)}. In the current period, the schedule prescribes the wage wh(xg),
i.e. w1(xg)=wh(xg). If in the next period the economy is still in state xg, the schedule
prescribes the ﬁrst-best hiring wage for junior workers and the ﬁrst-best insurance wage for
senior workers, i.e. w1,2(xg;xg)=wh(xg) and w2,2(xg;xg)=wi(w1(xg),x g).S i n c ewh(xg) is
equal to wi(w1(xg),x g), these prescriptions do not induce worker replacement. In contrast,
if the economy moves to the state xb,t h eﬁrst-best insurance wage and the ﬁrst-best hiring
wage would induce ﬁrms to replace senior workers with junior hires. In this case, as long as
aggregate productivity shocks are suﬃciently small, the schedule prescribes the wage wf for
both junior and senior employees, where wf >w h(xb). Overall, the schedule ω(xg) coincides
with the full commitment benchmark if the economy remains in the expansionary state, but
it diﬀers when the economy transits to the recessionary state.
Lemma 5: In a Recursive Equilibrium with Entry: (i) The value of searching Z(x) is such
21that Z(xg) >Z (xb), and the ﬁrst-best hiring wage wh(x) is such that wh(xg) >w h(xb).
( i i )T h ew a g es c h e d u l eω1(xb)={w1(xb),w i,2(ˆ x;xb)} is such that w1,2(ˆ x;xb)=wh(ˆ x)
and w1,2(ˆ x;xb)=wh(xb). (iii) The wage schedule ω1(xg)={w1(xg),w i,2(ˆ x;xg)} is such
that wi,2(xg;xg)=wh(xg) for i =1 ,2. Moreover, there exists an  >0 such that, if
k(y1g,y 2,g) − (y1,b,y 2,b)k <  ,t h e nwi,2(xb;xb)=wf for i = {1,2},w h e r ewf >w h(xb).
The proof of this lemma is straightforward and is omitted for the sake of brevity. However,
all details are available upon request.
5.3 Vacancy and Unemployment Dynamics
Consider a period in which the economy transitions from the expansionary to the reces-
sionary state. In this period, old ﬁrms oﬀer the wage wf to both junior and senior work-
ers. Given these wages, old ﬁrms receive q2 applications for each of their vacant positions,
q2 = q(W2(wf;xb)), and they do not receive applications for any of their ﬁlled positions.
Moreover, in this period, new ﬁrms oﬀe rt h ew a g es c h e d u l eω1(xb). Given this schedule, new
ﬁrms receive q1 applications for each of their vacant positions, q1 = q(W2(wh(xb);xb)).14
The number of ﬁrms that enter the labor market is such that the measure of applications
submitted by the workers is equal to the measure of applications received by the ﬁrms. In
particular, the measure of applications received by new ﬁr m si se q u a lt of1nq1,w h e r ef1
denotes the number of new ﬁrms in the labor market. The measure of applications received
by old ﬁr m si se q u a lt of2[n − n1(1 − δ)]q2,w h e r ef2 denotes the number of old ﬁrms in
the labor market. Finally, the measure of applications submitted by workers is equal to the
measure of unemployed workers at the beginning of the period, i.e. 1−f2n1.T h e r e f o r e ,t h e
number of ﬁrms that enter the labor market is
f1 =( nq1)
−1 {1 − f2n1 − f2[n − n1(1 − δ)]q2}. (GE1)
At the search stage, new ﬁrms have f1n vacancies, and old ﬁrms have f2[n − n1(1 − δ)]
vacancies. Therefore, at the search stage, the vacancy rate is
ν = f1n + f2[n − n1(1 − δ)]. (GE2)
14Perhaps, it is useful to remind the reader that, in a Recursive Equilibrium with Entry, the optimal wage
schedule posted by new ﬁrms does not depend on the prescriptions of the wage schedule oﬀered by old ﬁrms.
22At the production stage, new ﬁrms employ f1nη(q1) workers, and old ﬁrms employ f2n1(1−δ)
senior workers as well as f2[n−n1(1−δ)]η(q2) junior workers. Therefore, at the production
stage, the unemployment rate is
υ =1− f1nη(q1) − f2 {n1(1 − δ)+[ n − n1(1 − δ)]η(q2)}. (GE3)
If ﬁrms could commit to not replace workers, how diﬀerently would vacancies and un-
employment respond to the negative shock to the aggregate component of productivity? In
order to answer this question, notice that, under full commitment, old ﬁrms would oﬀer
the wage wh(xb) to their junior employees and the wage wh(xg) to their senior employees.
And new ﬁrms would oﬀer the wage schedule ω1(xb). Therefore, under full commitment,
old ﬁrms would attract q2 −q1 fewer applicants for each of their vacant positions, while new
ﬁrms would attract the same number of applicants for each of their vacant positions. As a
result, under full commitment, ∆f additional ﬁrms would enter the labor market, and ∆ν
additional vacancies would be opened, where
∆f =( nq1)−1f2[n − n1(1 − δ)](q2 − q1) > 0,
∆ν = q
−1
1 f2[n − n1(1 − δ)](q2 − q1) > 0.
(GE4)
Under full commitment, new ﬁrms would employ ∆fnη(q1) additional workers, and old
ﬁrms would employ f2[n − n1(1 − δ)](η(q2) − η(q1)) fewer workers. Therefore, under full
commitment, the unemployment rate would be υ + ∆υ,w h e r e
∆υ = f2[n − n1(1 − δ)][η(q2) − η(q1) − q
−1
1 (q2 − q1)η(q1)]. (GE5)
Since the job-ﬁlling probability η(q) is concave with respect to the queue length and q2 >q 1,
the increase in the measure of workers employed by new ﬁrms is greater than the decrease
in the measure of workers employed by old ﬁrms. Therefore, ∆υ is strictly negative.15
From the previous discussion, it follows that the response of unemployment and vacancies
to a negative shock to the aggregate component of productivity is magniﬁed by the ﬁrms’
limited commitment. In contrast, from the characterization of the wage schedule oﬀered
by new ﬁrms in state xb,i tf o l l o w st h a tt h er e s p o n s eo fu n e m p l o y m e n ta n dv a c a n c i e st oa
15Since η(q) is concave and η(0) is equal to 0, it follows that q
−1
1 η(q1) is strictly greater than η0(q1).S i n c e
η(q) is concave and q2 is greater than q1, it follows that (q2 − q1)−1 (η(q2) − η(q1)) is smaller than η0(q1).
Therefore, q
−1
1 (q2 − q1)η(q1) is strictly greater than η(q2) − η(q1) and ∆u < 0.
23positive shock to the aggregate component of productivity is the same under full and limited
commitment. These ﬁndings are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: (Macro Consequences of the Replacement Problem) In a Recursive Equilibrium
with Entry: (i) When the economy moves from state xg to xb, the increase in unemployment
and the decline in vacancies are greater because of the ﬁrm’s limited commitment. (ii) When
the economy moves from state xb to xg, the decrease in unemployment and the increase in
vacancies are unaﬀected by the ﬁrm’s limited commitment.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we studied a labor market in which ﬁr m sh a v et w og o a l s .F i r s t ,aﬁrm wants to
insure its workers against income ﬂuctuations. In order to do this eﬃciently, a ﬁrm should
oﬀer to its senior workers a wage that is independent from its productivity and from the
aggregate conditions of the economy. Also, a ﬁrm should employ its senior workers as long
as the gains from trade are positive. Second, a ﬁrm wants to recruit new workers to ﬁll its
vacant positions. In order to do this eﬃciently, a ﬁrm should oﬀer to their junior workers
a wage that depends on its productivity and on the aggregate conditions of the economy.
However, since a ﬁrm cannot commit to not replace senior workers with new hires, it cannot
simultaneously attain eﬃcient insurance and eﬃcient recruitment.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we studied how the worker replacement problem aﬀects the
design of the ﬁrm’s optimal wage schedule. We found that the optimal schedule divides the
ﬁrm’s productivity space into three regions. If the ﬁrm’s productivity is in the highest region,
the optimal schedule prescribes the eﬃcient hiring wage for junior employees and the eﬃcient
insurance wage for senior employees. In this region, the ﬁrm has no incentive to replace its
senior employees, because the eﬃc i e n th i r i n gw a g ei sg r e a t e rt h a nt h ee ﬃcient insurance wage.
If the ﬁrm’s productivity falls in the intermediate region, the optimal schedule prescribes
the same wage for junior and senior employees. This wage is greater than the eﬃcient hiring
w a g ea n ds m a l l e rt h a nt h ee ﬃcient insurance wage, but it guarantees that senior workers
will not be replaced with new hires. When the ﬁrm’s productivity falls in the lowest region,
the optimal schedule may induce the ﬁrm to replace its senior employees with new hires.
When this is the case, the schedule prescribes that senior workers should receive the eﬃcient
24insurance wage, and junior employees should be paid strictly less than the eﬃcient hiring
wage.
In the second part of the paper, we studied how the replacement problem aﬀects (through
its eﬀect on the design of the optimal wage schedule) the response of unemployment and va-
cancies to aggregate productivity shocks. We found that the replacement problem magniﬁes
the response of unemployment and vacancies to small negative productivity shocks. In con-
trast, we found that the replacement problem does not aﬀect the response of unemployment
and vacancies to positive productivity shocks.
25Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) Let ω∗
1 = {w∗
1,w ∗
i,2} denote the wage schedule that solves the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt maximization problem (E6) for s1 = {x1,y 1,σ 1}.L e tv∗
1 denote w∗
1,2(s2) for s2 ∈ S∗,
where S∗ is equal to {(x,y,σ):x = x2,y= y2,σ∈ [σ2,σ 2]}. Similarly, let v∗
2 denote w∗
2,2(s2)




Next, let ω1 = {w1,w i,2} denote an alternative schedule such that: (i) for all s2 / ∈ S∗, wi,2(s2)
is equal to w∗
i,2(s2); (ii) for all s2 ∈ S∗,w i,2(s2) is equal to vi, vi ∈ R+; (iii) W1(ω1;x1)=
W1(ω∗
1;x1). In words, the alternative schedule ω1 is such that: (i) in all states s2 / ∈ S∗,t h e
wages for junior and senior workers are the same as under the optimal schedule ω∗
1; (ii) in
all states s2 ∈ S∗, the wages for junior and senior workers may be diﬀerent than under the
schedule ω∗
1; (iii) in its ﬁrst period of activity, the ﬁrm oﬀers the same lifetime utility as
under the schedule ω∗
1. The last property implies that, in its ﬁrst period of activity, the ﬁrm
employs the same number of workers as under the schedule ω∗
1.
First, consider the case in which v2 ≤ v1 and v2 ∈ [b,y2]. In this case, the diﬀerence between
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts under the optimal schedules, ω∗





1)+β Pr(S∗)n1(1 − δ)(v2 − v∗
2)+
β Pr(S∗)[n − n1(1 − δ)][μ(v∗
1;x2)(y2 − v∗
1) − μ(v1;x2)(y2 − v1)] ≥ 0,
(A1)







2) − u(v2))). (A2)









[n − n1(1 − δ)][μ(v∗
1;x2)(y2 − v∗
1) − μ(v1;x2)(y2 − v1)] ≥ 0.
(A3)




Next consider the case in which v1 <v 2 and v2 ∈ [b,y2]. In this case, the diﬀerence between
26the ﬁrm’s proﬁts under the optimal schedule, ω∗
1, and under the alternative schedule, ω1, is
equal to
F1(n1,ω∗
1;s1) − F1(n1,ω1;s1)=n1(w1 − w∗
1)+
β Pr(S∗)n1(1 − δ)[μ(v1;x2)v1 +( 1− μ(v1;x2))v2 − v∗
2]+
β Pr(S∗)[n − n1(1 − δ)][μ(v∗
1;x2)(y2 − v∗
1) − μ(v1;x2)(y2 − v1)] ≥ 0,
(A4)







2) − μ(v1;x2)u(b) − (1 − μ(v1;x2))u(v2)]). (A5)




1;s1) − F1(n1,ω1;s1))/β Pr(S∗)] =
n1(1 − δ)[u(v∗
2) − μ(v1;x2)u(b) − (1 − μ(v1;x2))u(v2)]/u0(w∗
1)+
n1(1 − δ)[μ(v1;x2)v1 +( 1− μ(v1;x2))v2 − v∗
2]+
[n − n1(1 − δ)][μ(v∗
1;x2)(y2 − v∗
1) − μ(v1;x2)(y2 − v1)] ≥ 0.
(A6)




Finally, notice that inequality (A3) holds for all wages {v1,v 2} such that v2 ≤ v1 and b ≤
v2 ≤ y2. Moreover, notice that inequality (A6) holds for all wages {v1,v 2} such that v1 <v 2





2;ψ2)=m a x {Vk(ψ2),V r(ψ2)}. (A7)
(ii) We omit the proof of part (ii) because it is similar to the proof of part (i). We omit
the proof of part (iii) because it is straightforward. However, all details are available upon
request. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : The maximization problem (C3) can be written as
V ∗
c (ψ2)= [ n − n1(1 − δ)]max
v1
{μ(v1,x 2)(y2 − v1)}+
[n1(1 − δ)] max
b≤v2≤y2
{[u(v2)+( 1− δ)−1Φ(x2)]/u0(w1)+y2 − v2}.
(A8)
(i) Consider the ﬁrst maximization problem in (A8). The maximand of this problem is
continuous with respect to v1;i ti se q u a lt oz e r of o rv1 ≤ z(x2); it is strictly positive for
27v1 ∈ (z(x2),y 2); and it is smaller or equal than zero for all v1 ≥ y2. Therefore, the maximizer
of this problem exists and belongs to the open interval between z(x2) and y2.
Over the interval (z(x2),y 2), the derivative of the maximand with respect to v1 is
d[μ(v1,x 2)(y2 − v1)]/dv1 =
η0(q(W2(v1;x2)))q0(W2(v1;x2))W0
2(v1;x2)(y2 − v1) − η(q(W2(v1;x2))),
(A9)
where q(W2(v1;x2)) is deﬁned by the solution to the equation
Z(x2)=u(b)+βEˆ x[Z(ˆ x)] + λ(q)[u(v1) − u(b)]. (A10)
After diﬀerentiating (A10) with respect to v1,w ec a nr e w r i t e( A 9 )a s
d[μ(v1,x 2)(y2 − v1)]/dv1 =
η0(q(W2(v1;x2)))q(W2(v1;x2))





Equation (A10) implies that q(W2(v1;x)) is strictly increasing with respect to v1.S i n c e
η0(q)q/(1− η(q)) is decreasing in q,t h eﬁrst term on the right hand side of (A11) is strictly
decreasing with respect to v1.A l s o , s i n c e η(q) is strictly increasing with respect to q,t h e
second term on the right hand side of (A11) is strictly increasing with respect to v1.T h e r e -
fore, the maximand of the ﬁrst problem in (A1) is strictly concave with respect to v1 over
the interval (z(x2),y 2).
From the previous observations, it follows that the maximizer of the ﬁrst problem in (A8) is
t h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt ot h eﬁrst order condition
η0(q(W2(v1;x2)))q(W2(v1;x2))
1 −  η(q(W2(v1;x2)))
u0(v1)(y2 − v1)
u(v1) − u(b)
− η(q(W2(v1;x2))) = 0. (A12)
Since the left hand side of (A12) is strictly increasing in y2, the maximizer is a function
wh(s2) that is strictly increasing with respect to the ﬁrm’s productivity y2.
(ii) The reader can immediately verify that min{w1,y 2} is the unique solution to the second
maximization problem in (A8). ¥
28P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : The maximization problem (C4) can be written as
V ∗
k (ψ2)=m a x
v1,v2
[n − n1(1 − δ)]μ(v1,x 2)(y2 − v1)+
n1(1 − δ){[u(v2)+( 1− δ)−1Φ(x2)]/u0(w1)+y2 − v2},
s.t. b ≤ v2 ≤ v1 ≤ y2.
(A13)
First, notice that the objective function in (A13) is continuous with respect to {v1,v 2}a n dt h e
the feasible set is non-empty and compact. Therefore, a solution to the maximization problem
(A13) exists. Second, notice that the objective function is strictly concave with respect to
{v1,v 2} and the feasible set is convex. Therefore, the solution to the maximization problem
(A13) is unique. Moreover, the solution {vk
1(ψ2),vk
2(ψ2)} and the multiplier φ
r(ψ2) satisfy
the following necessary and suﬃcient conditions for optimality with respect to {v1,v 2,φ}:
(i) the wage v1 is such that
[n − n1(1 − δ)][μ
0(v1,x 2)(y2 − v1) − μ(v1,x 2)] + φ ≥ 0 (A14)
and v1 ≤ y2, with complementary slackness;
(ii) the wage v2 is such that
n1(1 − δ)[u
0(v2)/u
0(w1) − 1] − φ ≤ 0 (A15)
and b ≤ v, with complementary slackness;
(iii) the multiplier φ is such that φ ≥ 0 and v1 − v2 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness.
For all y2 ≥ k1(w1,x 2), it is immediate to verify that the triple {wh(s2),w i(w1,s 2),0} satisﬁes
the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for optimality (i)—(iii) with respect to {v1,v 2,φ}.F o r
all y2 <k 1(w1,x 2), it is immediate to verify that the optimality conditions (i)—(iii) are
satisﬁed by the triple {wf(ψ2),w f(ψ2),φ
f},w h e r eφ
f is equal to n1(1−δ)[u0(v2)/u0(w1)−1]
and wf is such that





f,x 2)(y2 − w






and wf ≤ y2, with complementary slackness.
Denote with k2(n1,w 1,s 2) the level of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity such that
−






29Clearly, k2(n1,w 1,s 2) is strictly greater than z(x2) and strictly smaller than k1(w1,x 2).F o r
all y2 ≤ k2(n1,w 1,s 2), the left hand side of (A16) is strictly decreasing with respect to v1,
and it is strictly positive at v1 = y2. Therefore, for all y2 ≤ k2(n1,w 1,s 2),t h ew a g ewf(ψ2)
is equal to y2. For all y2 in the interval (k2(n1,w 1,s 2),k 1(w1,x 2)),t h eﬁrst term on the
left hand side of (A16) is strictly decreasing with respect to v1, and it is equal to zero at
v1 = wh(s2),w h e r ewh(s2) <w 1. For all y2 in the interval (k2(n1,w 1,s 2),k 1(w1,x 2)),t h e
second term on the left hand side of (A16) is strictly decreasing with respect to v2,a n di t
is equal to zero at v1 = w1.M o r e o v e r ,f o r a l ly2 between k2(n1,w 1,s 2) and k1(w1,x 2),t h e
sum of the ﬁrst and the second term on the left hand side of (A16) is strictly negative at
v1 = y2. Therefore, for all y2 between k2(n1,w 1,s 2) and k1(w1,x 2), wf(ψ2) is strictly greater
than the ﬁrst-best hiring wage wh(s2), and it is strictly smaller than the ﬁrst-best insurance
wage wi(w1,s 2)=m i n {w1,y 2}. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 : Without the replacement constraint v1 <v 2, the maximization problem
(C5) can be written as
V ∗
r (ψ2)=m a x
v1
nμ(v1;x2)(y2 − v1)+n1(1 − δ)(u(b)+Φ(x2))/u0(w1)+
n1(1 − δ)(1 − μ(v1;x2)) max
b≤v2≤y2
{(u(v2) − u(b))/u0(w1)+y2 − v2}.
(A18)
First, consider the inner maximization problem in (A18). As proved in Lemma 4.2, the
maximizer of this problem is the ﬁrst-best insurance wage wi(w1,s 2). Next, consider the
outer maximization problem in (A18). The maximand of this problem is continuous with
respect to v1; it is constant for all v1 ≤ z(x2); and it is strictly decreasing for all v1 ≥ wh(s2).
Therefore, the maximizer of this problem exists and and belongs to the open interval between
z(x2) and wh(s2). Finally, notice that the maximizer of the inner problem is greater than the
maximizer than the outer problem because wh(s2) <w i(w1,s 2) for all y2 between z(x2) and
k1(w1,x 2). Therefore, the solution to the maximization problem (A15) is also the solution
to the maximization problem (C5). ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 : From the proof of Lemma 2, it follows immediately that the value
function V ∗
c (ψ2) is equal to maxv1,v2 Vk(v1,v 2;ψ2) subject to b ≤ v1,v 2 ≤ y2. The objective
function Vk(v1,v 2;ψ2) is continuous with respect to v1,v 2 and y2. The feasible set Γc =
30{v1,v 2 : b ≤ v1,v 2 ≤ y2} is non-empty, bounded and continuous with respect to y2.T h e r e f o r e ,
by the Theorem of the Maximum, the value function V ∗
c (ψ2) is continuous with respect to
y2.
The value function V ∗
k (ψ2) is equal to maxv1,v2 Vk(v1,v 2;ψ2) subject to b ≤ v2 ≤ v1 ≤ y2.
T h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o nVk(v1,v 2;ψ2) is continuous with respect to v1,v 2 and y2. The feasible
set Γk = {v1,v 2 : b ≤ v2 ≤ v1 ≤ y2} is non-empty, bounded and continuous with respect to
y2. Therefore, by the Theorem of the Maximum, the value function V ∗
k (ψ2) is continuous
with respect to y2. Moreover, since Γk ⊂ Γc, V ∗
k (ψ2) is smaller or equal to V ∗
c (ψ2).A n d
since {vk
1(ψ2),vk
2(ψ2)} is equal to {wh(s2),w i(w1,s 2)} for all y2 ≥ k1(w1,x 2), V ∗
k (ψ2) is equal
to V ∗
c (ψ2) for all y2 ≥ k1(w1,x 2).
From the proof of Lemma 4, it follows immediately that the value function V ∗
r (ψ2) is smaller
or equal to V
∗
r(ψ2),w h e r eV
∗
r(ψ2) is deﬁned as maxv1 Vr(v1,w h(w1,s 2);ψ2) subject to z(x2) ≤
v1 ≤ y2. The objective function Vr(v1,w h(w1,s 2);ψ2) is continuous with respect to v1 and
y2.T h ef e a s i b l es e tΓr = {v1 : z(x2) ≤ v1 ≤ y2} is non-empty, bounded and continuous with
respect to y2. Therefore, by the Theorem of the Maximum, the value function V
∗
r(ψ2) is
continuous with respect to ψ2.M o r e o v e r ,t h ed i ﬀerence between V ∗










n1(1 − δ)μ(v1;x2)[(u(wi(w1,s 2)) − u(b))/u0(w1)+v1 − wi(w1,s 2)]+
[n − n1(1 − δ)][μ(wh(s2))(y2 − wh(s2)) − μ(v1)(y2 − v1)].
(A19)
From the concavity of u(w), it follows that u(wi)−u(b) is strictly greater than u0(wi)( wi−b).
From wi ≤ w1 and b ≤ z(x2) ≤ v1,i tf o l l o w st h a tu(wi)−u(b) is strictly greater than u0(w1)
(wi − v1). Therefore, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (A19) is strictly greater than
zero for all v1 >z (x2), and it is equal to zero for v1 = z(x2). Moreover, the second term on
the right hand side of (A19) is strictly greater than zero for all v1 6= wh(s2), and it is equal
to zero for v1 = wh(s2). Since wh(s2) >z (x2), it follows that the right hand side of (A19) is
strictly positive. Hence, V ∗
c (ψ2) > V
∗
r(ψ2).
For all y2 ≥ k1(w1,x 2), the value function V ∗
k (ψ2) is equal to V ∗
c (ψ2), and the value function
V
∗
r(ψ2) is strictly smaller than V ∗
c (ψ2). Moreover, since the value functions V ∗




r(ψ2) are continuous with respect to y2,t h e r ee x i s t sa n >0 such that, if y2 is
between k1(w1,x 2) −   and k1(w1,x 2),t h e nV ∗
k (ψ2) is strictly greater than V
∗
r(ψ2).S i n c e
V ∗
r (ψ2) ≤ V
∗




2(s2)} for all y2 greater than k1(w1,x 2) −  . ¥
32 
y2 
     z 
     w1 
45º
   w
h 
    w
i 
                           
                                 Figure 1: Full Commitment Benchmark 
    k1
 
y2
     z 




                           
            Figure 2: Best Schedule With and Without Worker Replacement 
     k1 
y2




   w
h
 (a) Without Replacement       (b) With Replacement  
33 
y2 
     z 
     w1 
45º
   w1,2 
    w2,2 
                           
                                    Figure 3: Optimal Wage Schedule 
    k3      k1    k2
34References
[1] Acemoglu, D., and R. Shimer. 1999. Eﬃcient Unemployment Insurance. J.P.E. 107:
893—928.
[2] Azariadis, C. 1975. Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria. J.P.E. 83:
1183—202.
[3] Baily, M. 1974. Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand. Rev. Econ. Studies
41: 37—50.
[4] Beaudry, P., and J. DiNardo. 1991. The Eﬀe c to fI m p l i c i tC o n t r a c t so nt h eM o v e m e n t
of Wages Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro Data. J.P.E. 99: 665—688.
[5] Bewley, T. 1999. Why Wages Don’t Fall during a Recession. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
[6] Boldrin, M., and M. Horvath. 1995. Labor Contracts and Business Cycles. J.P.E. 103:
972—1004.
[7] Burdett, K., and M. Coles. 2003. Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts. Econometrica
71: 1377—404.
[8] Garibaldi, P., and E. Moen. 2008. Industry Dynamics and Search in the Labor Market.
Manuscript, Norwegian School of Management.
[9] Gertler, M., and A. Trigari. 2006. Unemployment Fluctuations with Staggered Nash
Bargaining. Manuscript, NYU.
[10] Hagedorn, M., and I. Manovskii. 2008. The Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment and
Vacancies Revisited. A.E.R.
[11] Hall, R. 2005. Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness. A.E.R. 95:
50—65.
[12] Holmstrom, B. 1983. Equilibrium Long-Term Contracts. Q.J.E. 98: 23—55.
[13] Kennan, J. 2008. Private Information, Wage Bargaining and Employment Fluctuations.
Manuscript, University of Winsonsin-Madison.
[14] MacLeod, B., and J. Malcomson. Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and In-
voluntary Unemployment. Econometrica 57: 447—80.
[15] Menzio, G. 2005. High-Frequency Wage Rigidity. Manuscript, Univ. Pennsylvania.
35[16] ––. 2007. A Theory of Partially Directed Search. J.P.E. 115: 748—69.
[17] Menzio, G., and S. Shi. 2008a. Eﬃcient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle. PIER
Working Paper.
[18] ––. 2008b. A Tractable Model of Search on the Job and Aggregate Fluctuations.
Manuscript, Univ. Pennsylvania.
[19] Moen, E. 1997. Competitive Search Equilibrium. J.P.E. 105: 694—723.
[20] Moen, E., and Å. Rosen, 2008. Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium. Working
paper, Norwegian School of Management.
[21] Pissarides, C. 1985. Short-Run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment, Vacancies and
Real Wages. A.E.R. 75: 676—90.
[22] Ramey, G. 2008. Exogenous vs. Endogenous Separation. Manuscript, U.C. San Diego.
[23] Rudanko, L. 2006. Labor Market Dynamics under Long Term Wage Contracting and
Incomplete Markets. Manuscript, Univ. Chicago.
[24] Shimer, R. 2005. The Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment and Vacancies. A.E.R. 95:
25—49.
[25] Snell, A., and J. Thomas. 2007. Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment, and Wage-
Unemployment Dynamics. Manuscript, Univ. of Edinburgh.
[26] Thomas, J., and T. Worrall. 1988. Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts. Rev. Econ. Studies
55: 541—53.
36